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Summary
This article examines the Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty and its possi-
ble consequences for European security. The article offers observations on the 
background and motivation for the Russian suspension. While the Soviet Union 
had a strong interest in the CFE Treaty in the late 1980s, in comparison, Russia 
has significantly less to gain from participating in the Treaty today. This is based 
primarily on the impact that geopolitical changes in Europe has had on Russia’s 
strategic and national security interests since the end of the Cold War. It is un-
likely that the CFE Treaty can make a significant contribution to European secu-
rity without Russia’s participation. Among the possible long-term implications 
of the Russian suspension is reduced military transparency as well as reduced 
emphasis on conventional arms control in Europe. 
3Introduction
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is frequently re-
ferred to as a cornerstone of European security.1 The Treaty has played a key 
role in limiting the size of conventional military forces in Europe and it has con-
tributed to increased transparency and trust among former adversaries. After 
the decision in December 2007 by the Russian Federation to suspend participa-
tion in the Treaty, however, the future of conventional arms control in Europe 
appears bleak.2 The deadlock between NATO and Russia over the CFE regime 
makes it questionable whether the Treaty will be able to regain its relevance as 
a multilateral disarmament regime. Furthermore, an erosion of the CFE regime 
could potentially mean the beginning of new arms races and confrontation on 
the European continent.3
Keeping in mind the significant achievements made by the CFE Treaty 
in the past, what consequences does the Russian suspension have for European 
security? Does it make sense for NATO to keep implementing the CFE Treaty 
without Russia, and for how long? The conflict in 2008 between Georgia and 
Russia over South Ossetia is an indication that Russia no longer sees itself bound 
by the Treaty’s legal restrictions on the deployment of its military forces. This 
article primarily examines Russia’s interest in suspending its participation in the 
CFE Treaty, and what the possible consequences are for European security. The 
article also discusses how the suspension affects the interests and choices of a 
flank state such as Norway.
Background and Scope of the CFE Treaty
Initial negotiations on conventional arms control between NATO and the War-
saw Pact started in 1973 within the framework of the Mutual and Balanced 
Force Reduction Talks, but failed to achieve substantial results (McCausland 
2009:2).4 The CFE Treaty, which was developed during the last years of the 
Cold War, proved to be much more successful. Both NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact sought a treaty which could reduce their reliance on large arsenals of con-
ventional military forces and which could produce greater stability at lower 
force levels. Stability in this context is to be understood as a lower prospect of 
1 The CFE Treaty was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 and entered into force on 
17 July 1992. The following 30 states are signatories: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, Ukraine and the United States. For the full text and related documents, the 
reader is referred to the OSCE internet site for original texts, available at http://osce.org/
item/13517.html. For analysis of the CFE Treaty, see, for example, Lachowski (2006:749-
773) and McCausland (2009).
2 The Russian suspension was announced in July 2007 and entered into force on 15 
December 2007. The Treaty does not provide provisions for suspensions. Article XIX 
(2) of the CFE Treaty sets the notification time to 150 days for any state that chooses to 
formally withdraw from the Treaty. 
3  Kouchner & Steinmeier (2007).
4  The primary objective of conventional arms control is to provide conventional force 
reductions in order to limit the likelihood of war, to limit damage if war occurs, and to 
limit the burden of national defense expenditures (Peters 1997:41). For further reading, 
see, for example, Hallenbeck and Shaver (1990).
4surprise attack than what would otherwise be possible without a treaty. After 
Soviet arms control initiatives emerged during 1986 and 1987, NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact embarked on negotiations with the aim of reducing the size of their 
conventional forces stationed in Europe (Harahan and Kuhn 1996:6-7).5
The CFE Treaty was signed by twenty-two states, all belonging to ei-
ther NATO or the Warsaw Pact. By including all states belonging to these two 
alliances, the bipolar power structure of the Cold War was institutionalized in 
the Treaty.6 The Treaty aimed to eliminate the existing disparities in force levels 
between the two alliances and to reduce the capability of either side to launch 
surprise attacks and to initiate large-scale offensive military actions in Europe. 
It also permitted both sides to disarm large parts of their conventional military 
arsenals.
The Treaty establishes upper ceilings on the number of conventional 
military forces which can be held by the two groups of states. Within the two 
groups, each member state share a collective set of force entitlements with the 
other states belonging to the same group.7 The ceilings are limited to certain cat-
egories of military equipment (treaty-limited equipment), of which each group is 
entitled to 20,000 battle tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 pieces 
of artillery, 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters.8 The groups of 
states are responsible for the Treaty’s implementation, implying that there must 
be internal agreement within each group in order for the Treaty to be success-
fully implemented. When the Treaty was designed, one fundamental assumption 
was that the states within each group were allies, an assumption which is not 
valid today.
The Treaty’s area of application today corresponds to the European 
land and island territories of the states parties. The eastern limit is defined by 
the Kazakh and Russian territories to the West of the Ural River and the Caspian 
Sea.9 The Treaty divides the area of application into sub-zones which are geo-
graphically determined.10 In particular, the sub-zones are designed to limit the 
5 Mikhail Gorbachev signaled interest in reductions of both conventional and nuclear 
forces in Europe (Harahan and Kuhn 1996:6-7). NATO proposed a two-track strategy 
that included both negotiations on arms control and a broader set of confidence and 
security-building measures. The broader set of confidence and security building 
measures would be conducted within the framework of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), while arms reductions would be negotiated in the CFE 
Treaty. Negotiations on the CFE began in March 1989.
6 See, for example, Waltz (1979). The CFE Treaty could be classified as a Treaty which has 
both structural and operational elements (Dunay 2004:7).
7 See, for example, Homan (2000:52).
8 The term “conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty” is defined in 
Art. II.1.Q. Limited equipment under the Treaty is frequently referred to as “Treaty-
limited Equipment” (TLE). These figures were to be achieved within 40 months after the 
entry into force of the Treaty. Definitions of each category are specified in Art. II.1. For a 
further overview of the CFE ceilings, see, for example, Crawford (1993).
9 CFE Treaty Article II.1. The area includes the Faroe Islands, Svalbard, Bear Island, the 
Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands, Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya. A section of 
southeast Turkey is not included in the area of application.
10  The area of application is divided into three sub-zones and two fl ank zones. The fi rst sub-
zone consists of the territories of the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia. The second sub-zone consists of Belarus, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast), United Kingdom and Ukraine (Regions 
5concentration of military equipment in the proximity of so-called flank states, 
located in the northern and southern periphery of the European continent.
Contributions to European Security
The CFE Treaty has made three significant contributions to European security 
(Falkenrath 1995:120). First, the Treaty has brought about a substantial reduc-
tion in the overall number of conventional weapons in Europe by implementing 
ceilings on the amount of military equipment held by its participating states.11 In 
particular, the number of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, com-
bat aircraft and attack helicopters has been reduced. In order to comply with the 
agreed ceilings of the CFE Treaty, participating states were obligated to disarm 
their surplus holdings of military equipment. This led to the destruction of more 
than 63,500 pieces of military equipment between November 1990 and January 
2003 (Lachowski 2003:694).12 
Second, the Treaty requires that states must reduce their excess military 
equipment in accordance with specific procedures in order to avoid recycling or 
reuse of dismantled equipment. For example, should a state choose to withdraw 
from the Treaty, equipment which has already been dismantled by that state 
cannot be reconverted quickly into treaty-limited equipment. This reduces the 
possibility that a state or a group of states can exploit the disarmament process 
for aggressive purposes, and it adds an additional element of stability to Euro-
pean security. The procedures for disarmament include regulations on destruc-
tion, conversion of equipment into non-military purposes, use of equipment for 
static displays or use of equipment for instructional purposes.13
Third, a major benefit with the Treaty is the robust verifications- and 
inspections regime. The CFE states have agreed to share information concern-
ing all their treaty-limited equipment and to permit on-site inspections by other 
CFE states. This mechanism was introduced in order to increase military trans-
parency and to verify that the Treaty was being implemented according to its 
purpose. So far, more than 5,500 inspections have been carried out (McCaus-
land 2009:5). These inspections have made it possible to resolve disputes con-
cerning the Treaty’s implementation (Falkenrath 1995:120-121).14 The verifica-
tions- and inspections regime not only makes it possible to conduct fact-finding 
of former Carpathian and Kiev Military Districts). The third sub-zone consists of 
Kazakhstan, Portugal, Russia and Spain (The regions of Kazakhstan and Russia west 
of the Ural Mountains). The flank zones are divided into one zone in Northern Europe 
and one in Southern Europe. The northern zone includes Iceland, Norway and most of 
Leningrad Military District. The southern zone includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia’s North Caucasus Military District and the part of 
Ukraine which was part of the former Odessa Military District.
11 The ceilings on military equipment became binding with unlimited duration in November 
1995, 40 months after the Treaty entered into force (CFE Treaty Art. VII.1).
12 Within the area of application, the figure was 52,252 pieces of treaty-limited equipment. 
For various figures, see Falkenrath (1995:119), Hain-Cole (1997:16), Homan (2000:52), 
Crawford (2003) and McCausland (2009:5).
13  CFE Treaty Article VIII.2. Most of the excess equipment is believed to have been destroyed 
according to the Treaty’s procedures (Andres 2009).
14  With the Stockholm Document of 1986, the Soviet Union for the first time allowed 
physical military inspections on its territory under a multinational agreement (Harahan 
and Kuhn 1996:6).
6missions to military installations, it is also an important facilitator of dialogue, 
for example within the framework of the regular meetings which are held in the 
Joint Consultative Group in Vienna. The verifications- and inspections regime 
has, perhaps more than any other component of the Treaty, served to promote 
transparency and openness in European military relations.
In addition to the contributions that the CFE Treaty has made to its par-
ticipating states, it should be noted that the Treaty has also benefited non-CFE 
states. As the Treaty has reduced the overall level of conventional forces on the 
European continent and increased transparency between East and West, non-
aligned as well as neutral countries have benefited from reduced tensions and 
increased stability. A limiting factor in the Treaty’s design is its narrow focus 
on five categories of military equipment and that certain types of equipment are 
not limited by the Treaty.15 Other shortcomings include a lack of CFE coverage 
east of the Ural Mountains, no curtailment of force generation capability, lack 
of control on production and the high costs associated with the destruction of 
military equipment. These shortcomings to some extent reduce the overall effec-
tiveness of the CFE Treaty (Dean and Forsberg 1992:98). They do not, however, 
challenge the fact that the Treaty has had an overall positive impact on Euro-
pean security and that the Treaty has been implemented fairly successfully until 
the Russian suspension in 2007.
The Flank Regime
The CFE Treaty includes a system of geographical limitations on the concen-
tration of military equipment in the northern and southern areas of Europe, 
frequently referred to as the flank regime. Briefly explained, the Treaty’s area of 
application is divided into four regional zones, consisting of three central zones 
and one flank zone. The flank zone is further divided into one northern and one 
southern flank. In the flank zone, the ceilings are significantly lower than what 
they are in Central Europe, thereby limiting each group’s ability to concentrate 
its military forces and to produce an overwhelming force ratio for offensive 
operations in the flanks. For example, in the flank zone, each group could origi-
nally hold a total of 4,700 battle tanks, 5,900 armored combat vehicles and 
6,000 pieces of artillery.16
The flank regime was designed to prevent a military buildup in the 
northern and southern areas of Europe with the purpose of reducing the military 
threat posed towards states such as for example Norway or Turkey. Although it 
originally was the concentration of Soviet forces that was the main concern for 
NATO, Norway, Greece, Iceland, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey were also in-
cluded within the flank regime. The Soviet Union was the only state subjected to 
regional force limitations on its own territory, notably within Leningrad, Pskov 
and Caucasus military districts (Andres 2009). After the Soviet Union collapsed, 
Ukraine and Russia were affected by the flank limitations.
The Soviet Union accepted the flank limitations as part of the CFE 
Treaty after a great deal of hesitation. In part, the flank regime was acceptable 
to the Soviet Union because conventional strategic thinking prevailing at the 
15  For example, military units such as naval and coastal defense units are not part of the 
CFE framework.
16  Within 40 months after the entry into force of the Treaty.
7time focused on Central Europe, not on the European periphery (Falkenrath 
1995:125). This made the northern and southern flanks less significant from 
a strategic military standpoint, and it made the flank regime acceptable to the 
Soviet negotiators. The military significance attached to the Central Region was 
also shared by NATO as part of its defense of Western Europe. This can be seen 
by examining NATO conventional force levels in the Central Region, where 
force levels remained stable during most of the Cold War, varying less than only 
10 percent (Duffield 1992:821-822).17 The Soviet acceptance of the flank regime 
did not mean that the Soviet Union had to compromise its strategic military 
interests in the CFE negotiations, even though it meant accepting restrictions 
within Soviet territory.
After the Soviet collapse, Russia had to share the existing flank ceilings 
with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This resulted in a 
national Russian flank entitlement of 1,300 battle tanks, 1,380 armored com-
bat vehicles and 1,680 pieces of artillery for both the northern and southern 
areas of the flank zone.18 By itself this might have been sufficient for Russia, but 
after security concerns became more acute with the emergence of the first war 
in Chechnya in 1994, the commitments undertaken in the flank regime were 
considered too constraining by Russia (Chernov 1995:87). Russia faced no in-
centive to reduce the number of forces in the southern flank as long as there was 
an active military conflict in the Caucasus, but rather had an urgent need for 
more forces. An additional problem was the Russian withdrawal of forces from 
bases in Eastern Europe and the need to station these forces in the existing bases 
within Russia (Andres 2009).
In 1995, NATO made an offer to ease some of the restrictions imposed 
by the flank regime in response to Russia’s concerns (Andres 2009).19 The chang-
es, which were agreed upon in 1996, constituted of a series of geographical and 
numerical changes which effectively allowed a reduction in the size of the flank 
zone and an increase in the number of Russian military forces which could be 
deployed there (see Figure 1). The revised flank zone effectively allows Russia 
to deploy more of its forces to the volatile southern border areas. The changes 
reduced some of the more immediate Russian concerns; however with the sec-
ond war in Chechnya emerging in 1999, Russia was unable to keep the number 
of forces in the flank zone below the permitted ceilings (Andres 2009, U.S. De-
partment of State 2001:23). These challenges have made the flank limitations 
particularly problematic for Russia (Chillaud 2006:25).
17  The NATO Central Region was defined to include Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and the Federal Republic of Germany, except the territory north of the Weser River 
(Duffield 1992:821).
18 Aircraft and helicopters were not included in the flank regime due to their mobility. 
In addition, the Treaty requires that a portion of these forces to be stored, making the 
effective number as low as 700 tanks, 1,300 pieces of artillery and 600 armored combat 
vehicles.
19 US officials were initially made aware of the problem in 1993 (McCausland 1995:9). In 
the short term, NATO hoped for Russian cooperation in relation to the deployment of the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. In the longer term and more important however, 
was the need to ease Russian concerns over future NATO-expansion in Eastern Europe 
(Andres 2009). 
8Adaptation of the Treaty
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, 
the bipolar power structure came to an end. With it, the largely confrontational 
nature of the Cold War disappeared, although some tensions persisted. Eight 
newly-independent states of the former Soviet Union accepted the rights and ob-
ligations of the CFE as successor states. These states were Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. The Baltic States, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia have 
since become members of NATO. Since Russia’s only remaining military allies 
and which are also participating states of the CFE Treaty are Armenia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, the Treaty’s concept of group ceilings does not reflect the bi-
polar power structure which prevailed during the Cold War.20 For example, in 
the CFE Treaty, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia all share the same group entitlements as Russia, but they are not politi-
cally or militarily associated with Russia (Falkenrath 1995:124, Harahan and 
Kuhn 1996:9). In other words, there is a clear mismatch between the concept of 
group ceilings and the current geopolitical environment.
In order to address this mismatch and to sustain the key role of the 
Treaty, work began in September 1996 to adapt it (Andres 2009). After three 
years of negotiations, agreement was reached on an adapted version in No-
vember 1999.21 The Adapted Treaty was designed to replace the original Treaty 
20 The Collective Security Treaty Organization includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
21 The Adaptation Agreement was signed on November 19, 1999 at the OSCE Istanbul 
Summit by Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, 
Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the 
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the 
Figure:  The Revised CFE 
Treaty flank zone (Lachowski 
1997)
9and make it relevant in the post-Cold War era (Homan 2000:53). The most 
significant difference in the Adapted Treaty compared to the original one is the 
replacement of the concept of group ceilings with a system of national ceilings. 
The national ceilings limit the number of conventional forces that can be sta-
tioned within each state’s territory, independent of alliance or group member-
ship. The Adapted Treaty also contains provisions which allow states to tem-
porarily exceed force quotas, as well as an accession clause for potential new 
state parties. The accession clause was added in order to address the Russian 
concerns relating to the non-participation of the Baltic States in the CFE Treaty, 
as Russia expected the Baltic States to join the Treaty (McCausland 2009:3).22 
Due to lower tensions in Europe following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, most European states cut their national holdings of military equipment 
after the Cold War. This contributed to a reduction in the overall holdings of 
military equipment in Europe (Homan 2000:54). Early Russian predictions were 
made, however, that the CFE Treaty would eventually deteriorate if Eastern Eu-
ropean states became members of NATO while Russia was excluded (Chernov 
1995:88). Russia failed to achieve some of its key adaptation goals in the Adapt-
ed Treaty, such as implementation of a group ceiling for NATO (in an effort to 
curb the expansion of NATO) and the elimination of the flank limitations (An-
dres 2009). A group ceiling for NATO would, if it came into effect, imply that 
further NATO expansion would not permit an increase in the overall number 
of military equipment held by NATO, which would have made the expansion 
much more acceptable to Russia. Furthermore, with the flank regime well in 
place in the Adapted Treaty, a major source of Russian concern remained.
Although Russia’s national holding of 28,931 pieces of equipment was 
the highest of any single state within the CFE regime, it was significantly lower 
than the sum of NATO’s holdings, which in 1999 amounted to 64,091 pieces of 
equipment (Andres 2009). Furthermore, in the Adapted Treaty, the sum of na-
tional ceilings for NATO-countries was well above the actual holdings of these 
countries and amounted to a total of 80,000 entitlements. In other words, the 
principle of balance of force, which originally was one of the structural compo-
nents of the CFE Treaty, is no longer applicable to the CFE regime.
Ratification of the Adapted Treaty
Despite that all 30 state parties to the CFE Treaty have signed the Adapted 
Treaty, it has yet to enter into force. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia 
have ratified the Adapted Treaty, while the remaining 26 signatories have not 
due to what is considered to be Russia’s inability to fulfill commitments which 
were undertaken at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit (Weitz 2008). These com-
mitments, which are frequently referred to as the “Istanbul commitments”, are 
central to understand the current deadlock between Russia and NATO. A cou-
ple of unresolved issues are at stake.
First, when the Adapted Treaty was signed at the OSCE Summit in Is-
United States. The Adapted Treaty will enter into force 10 days after the deposition of all 
instruments of ratification by all state parties.
22 The Baltic States expressed readiness to join the Adapted Treaty, once it entered into 
force. Should the Baltic States join the CFE Treaty it would reduce Russian concerns over 
NATO-forces stationed in the Baltic region.
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tanbul in November 1999, the OSCE Summit Declaration called for “an early, 
orderly and complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova” (OSCE 
1999). Russia on its part agreed to withdraw from Moldova by the end of 2002, 
a deadline which was welcomed by Moldovan authorities. However, Russia has 
not withdrawn all its military forces from Moldovan territory.23 Second, a simi-
lar situation continues to persist in relation to Georgia. The 1999 OSCE Summit 
Declaration calls for the resolution of the conflicts in the break-away regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia, where Russian forces are currently 
present. In Istanbul, Russia agreed to withdraw from the bases at Vaziani and 
Gudauta by 1 July, 2001. Despite repeated encouragements to withdraw its 
forces, Russia has not done so.� Russia therefore appears to be violating Article 
I.3 in the Adapted Treaty even before it has entered into force, since it requires 
explicit consent from the host state before conventional forces from one state 
can be present on another state’s territory. NATO insists that Russia must with-
draw its forces from Georgia and Moldova before the Adapted Treaty can be 
ratified by its member states.
The Russian view of the Istanbul commitments is that there is no legal 
linkage between the act of ratifying of the Adapted Treaty and the commitments 
which were undertaken at the Istanbul Summit in 1999 (Boese 2008). The 1999 
OSCE Summit Declaration should be understood as a political document rather 
than a legal one, under the assumption that the distinction between a political 
commitment as opposed to a legally binding one is that the former is understood 
as a promise between states without the force of law (Peters 1997:65). Russia 
argues that NATO should not use the ratification of the Adapted Treaty depend-
ent on the political commitment made in 1999 of withdrawal of Russian forces 
from Georgia and Moldova. The disagreement between NATO and Russia over 
the significance of the Istanbul commitments and the status of Russian military 
forces in Georgia and Moldova is one of the key issues of the current impasse. 
The deadlock has persisted since 1999 and does not appear to be resolved any 
time soon. Although Russia continues to argue that the Istanbul Summit Decla-
ration is not part of the CFE framework, a crucial question is nevertheless why 
Russia decided to unilaterally suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty alto-
gether, thereby freezing Russia’s engagement with NATO over the CFE regime
Key Issues of the Russian Suspension
Russia has not provided operational data since it suspended its participation in 
the CFE Treaty in 2007 and no longer participates in the inspections- and veri-
fications regime (McCausland 2009:4). This makes Russia currently a de facto 
non-participating state of the CFE Treaty. As there are no provisions for suspen-
sions in the Treaty, one question is whether the suspension could be considered 
legal, i.e. whether Russia has violated its international obligations or not.24 The 
23  The biggest obstacle to withdrawal was the presence of 42,000 tons of ammunition and 
25,000 small arms at the Kolbasna storage depot (U.S. Department of State 2001:20). 
24  Article XIX.2 of the CFE Treaty sets the notification time to 150 days for any state that 
chooses to formally withdraw from the Treaty. The fact that Russia’s suspension was 
effective 150 days after the announcement suggests that Russia has applied Article XIX.2 
as basis for announcing the suspension. However, Article XIX.2 only applies in the case 
of withdrawal from the Treaty, suggesting that in order for the suspension to be legal, it 
must be justified outside the scope of the Treaty.
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main challenge seems to be related to the distinction between suspension and 
withdrawal. Russia argues that, although there are no provisions for suspension 
in the Treaty, suspension is legally justified based on international law (Hollis 
2007). In other words, Russia maintains that any sovereign state can suspend 
its participation in an international Treaty if it desires to do so. This point is 
reflected in Article 57 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
to which Russia is a party, but with a requirement that the suspension is in con-
formity with the Treaty. In other words, Russia must base its legal argument on 
other sources than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, because the 
CFE Treaty makes no reference to suspension. This article does not examine the 
question of legality further.
Why did Russia suspend its participation rather than withdraw from 
the Treaty? There is a good chance that the answer is found partially in Russia’s 
disapproval of the non-ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by NATO mem-
bers (Hollis 2007).25 By suspending participation in the Treaty, Russia applies 
pressure on NATO rather than the other way around. Another reason for why 
Russia chose to suspend rather than withdraw could be that the Russian Presi-
dent has authority to suspend participation in the Treaty, but not to terminate 
it. Furthermore, the term suspension suggests that Russia’s non-participation in 
the Treaty will be of a limited duration, indicating that Russia seeks to resume 
its participation in the future without having to apply for membership like any 
other new state party. In addition, unilateral withdrawal from the CFE Treaty 
would most likely have had a much more negative impact on European relations 
than suspension.
However, Russia is not likely to resume its participation in the Treaty 
any time soon for a number of reasons which were communicated in a press 
release by the Kremlin on 14 July 2007.26 First, Russia objects to that the entry 
into NATO of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic has not brought about changes to the Treaty’s definition of group com-
position. As part of the eastern group of states, Russia shares the same entitle-
ments as former Warsaw Pact states. However, upon the entry into NATO of 
the states listed above, the balance of force has shifted significantly in Russia’s 
disfavour.
Second, from a Russian perspective, NATO should implement a lower 
overall force ceiling that compensates for the increased force holdings brought 
about by NATO-expansion. This would allow the balance of force between Rus-
sia and the West to be more equal. In addition, Russia argues that the expansion 
of NATO should be followed up by ratification of the Adapted Treaty, thereby 
effectively replacing the concept of group ceilings with national ceilings. Third, 
Russia has argued against the deployments of US military forces to Bulgaria and 
Romania, seeing them as having a negative impact on the balance of force.
 Fourth, the non-ratification of the Adapted Treaty by NATO means 
that the original and outdated CFE Treaty still remains the legally binding one. 
Russia views itself as being better off without participating in the original Treaty 
25  An extraordinary meeting of the Joint Consultative Group was held in Vienna on 11 
– 15 June 2007, but it failed to produce any substantive results. From NATO, it was 
again stressed that Russia must comply with the Istanbul commitments undertaken at the 
OSCE Summit in 1999. In return, NATO would ratify the adapted Treaty.
26  President of Russia (2007).
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rather than complying with NATO’s demand that Russia must fulfill its com-
mitments undertaken at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. Fifth, Russia views the high 
force ceilings of NATO-members Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Re-
public as problematic. Since these states are located in Central Europe, they are 
entitled to proportionally higher ceilings under the CFE Treaty. Russia views 
this imbalance as evidence that the original CFE Treaty is outdated. Sixth, Rus-
sia views the non-participation of the Baltic States in the CFE regime as a major 
problem since it means that these states have no force ceilings or any other obli-
gations under the Treaty. Russia has no means to restrict the number of NATO 
forces within the Baltic States.
In comparison, the situation was significantly different when the ne-
gotiations on the CFE Treaty began in 1987. While both the Soviet Union and 
NATO shared a genuine interest in a Treaty that would permit a future reduc-
tion in the size of their conventional forces, the Soviet Union had much more at 
stake than its counterparts (McCausland 2009:2). From a Soviet perspective, the 
arms control negotiations would serve the primary purpose of bettering political 
relations and domestic economic conditions, while the military significance was 
much more marginal (Dunay 2004:8).27
Historical developments were important contributors to the realization 
of the CFE Treaty. First and foremost, political events were unfolding which 
would change the geopolitical landscape in Europe. The Berlin Wall had fallen 
and Germany had been reunited; democratic revolutions took hold across Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had to tackle domestic unrest 
internally in areas such as the Baltic region, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In 
addition, President Gorbachev had announced in 1988 that the Soviet Union 
would withdraw approximately 50,000 troops from Central Europe (Harahan 
and Kuhn 1996:9). Despite being part of the Warsaw Pact, Central European 
nations deliberately continued to negotiate the CFE Treaty based on group ter-
minology in order to avoid any delays to the Soviet plans for military with-
drawal from Eastern Europe (Harahan and Kuhn 1996:12). By the time the 
negotiations started and until the Treaty was signed, six out of seven members 
of the Warsaw Pact had begun the process of disassociating themselves from 
the Soviet sphere of influence. Dissolution of the Warsaw Pact would certainly 
mean a weakened Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet leadership 
thus faced incentives to finalize the negotiations before Soviet influence became 
further marginalized. By signing an arms control agreement with NATO mem-
bers, force levels could be reduced across the European continent, thus allowing 
the Soviet Union to reduce its military footprint without substantial costs to its 
strategic concept.
Second, the economic situation in the Soviet Union by the late 1980s 
posed a serious challenge to Moscow (Harahan and Kuhn 1996:10). The huge 
amount of resources devoted to military expenditures was one of the biggest 
expenses. For example, data reveals that the Soviet Union spent approximately 
15, 8 percent of its total GDP on military expenditures in 1988, compared to 5, 
27 Both the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty were developed in parallel with the end of 
the Cold War. The Open Skies Treaty was negotiated in Vienna from 1989 to 1991, and 
signed in Helsinki in March 1992.
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7 percent in the United States (SIPRI 2008).28 In terms of real value, the military 
expenditures of the United States were approximately twice as large due to a 
significantly higher national GDP. This illustrates that the Soviet Union was at a 
significant disadvantage compared to its main rival. A comprehensive disarma-
ment treaty between the Soviet Union and NATO members would permit the 
Soviet Union to undertake a substantial reduction in its defense expenditures, 
shift resources towards more profitable sectors, and last but not least, precious 
time to carry out much-needed economic reforms. The burden of Soviet military 
expenditures provided a strong incentive for the Soviet leadership to sign an 
arms control treaty with the West.
Third, the Soviet negotiating position was weakened by internal strife 
within the Politburo. Gorbachev was aware that the Soviet military leadership 
was opposed to arms control negotiations with the West (Harahan and Kuhn 
1996:10, Falkenrath 1995:122).29 A significant reduction in military expen-
ditures and the size of military forces could, however unpopular, reduce the 
military’s power in Soviet society as well as their power versus Gorbachev. The 
threat from the military towards the political leadership became apparent dur-
ing the failed Soviet coup d’état in August 1991, approximately a year after the 
Treaty was signed (Falkenrath 1995:122).
Examining the time period from when the original CFE Treaty entered 
into force and until today, substantial changes have taken place in Europe which 
Russia views as being to its disadvantage. The concepts behind the CFE Treaty 
have become increasingly problematic because they do not adequately reflect the 
current geopolitical environment in Europe. With the escalation of military con-
flicts in the Caucasus, the expansion of NATO, the Baltic States’ decision to stay 
out of the Treaty, and the fact that no other state party has similar restrictions 
as Russia with regards to the flank limitations, participation in the CFE Treaty 
is difficult to justify for Russia today. The fact that the Treaty was implemented 
by Russia until 2007 could simply be due to a strong Russian expectation that 
the Adapted Treaty would soon be ratified by NATO members, thereby easing 
at least some of the Russian concerns.
Consequences for European Security
Given the current deadlock between NATO and Russia over the CFE Treaty, 
a key question is what the consequences are for European security. Will the 
suspension have any significant impact? The answer to this question depends 
first of all on how long the current status quo is maintained and whether or not 
NATO-members will eventually decide to abandon the Treaty. A future demise 
of the CFE Treaty could have an impact on other aspects of European security 
28 For sources on the Soviet data, see Cooper (1998). The US data is from the financial 
year 1 October – 30 September (SIPRI 2008). The Soviet military expenditures in 1988 
equaled approximately $218.4 billion based on constant 2005 rates.  The US value of 5, 
7 percent of GDP corresponds to approximately $484.0 billion in constant 2005 rates.
29 This information is based on an interview with the Soviet Chief Arms Control Negotiator 
for the CFE Treaty, Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky (Harahan and Kuhn 1996:10). Marshal 
Sergei Akhromeyev (Chief of the General Staff until 1988, Advisor to the President of the 
USSR from March 1990), the head of the KGB, the Director of the Central Committee’s 
International Department, and the Military Departments were identified as being opposed 
to arms control negotiations (Harahan and Kuhn 1996:10).
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beyond just conventional arms control. Some would even argue that it is not 
too far-fetched to imagine a dramatic realignment of European security (Mc-
Causland 2009:6). On the other hand, despite suspending participation in the 
Treaty, it appears unlikely that Russia will significantly increase the size of its 
conventional military arsenal in the near future (Weitz 2008:9). It is therefore 
not immediately clear what impact, if any, the suspension will eventually have 
on European security. However, there is little question that Russia has raised 
the stakes by suspending participation in the CFE Treaty (Lachowski 2009:7). 
In the short and medium term, Russia has achieved its aim of freeing itself from 
the restrictions and limitations associated with the CFE regime. In the longer 
term, Russia’s aim may be to extract favorable concessions from the West be-
fore eventually resuming its participation in the Treaty. Russia has little to gain 
by participating in the current CFE regime while the existing restrictions on 
Russian security interests are in place. The flank regime could serve as a good 
example of how Russia’s security interests are negatively affected by the Treaty.
There are a couple of issues caused by the Russian suspension which 
may have some impact on European security. First and foremost, it will be dif-
ficult to achieve the same degree of military transparency between Russia and 
the West in the future, at least when compared to what was achieved through 
the CFE regime. There is no mechanism in place which is nearly as extensive as 
the CFE regime and which can facilitate regular on-site inspections to Russian 
conventional military installations. The main challenge is how to maintain the 
same degree of trust and transparency between Russia and the West without 
the CFE regime. European states will most likely be forced to spend more time 
worrying about military activities rather than on political and economic issues.
Second, the suspension means that the CFE flank regime is paralyzed. 
For flank states such as Norway and Turkey, the flank limitations are impor-
tant in the sense that they serve as a stabilizing factor in military relations with 
Russia. While Norway and Turkey are still bound by the Treaty’s flank limita-
tions, Russia has suspended its obligations and can reap the benefits of the flank 
regime while avoiding costs associated with implementing the regime. In other 
words, Russia can freely station its military forces in the northern and southern 
flanks without restrictions while the remaining CFE states are bound by the ceil-
ings of the CFE Treaty. Third, even though Russia has suspended its participa-
tion in the Treaty, the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 contradicts 
the principles enshrined in the Treaty (McCausland 2009:5). This could make it 
difficult to restore trust and confidence between East and West and complicate 
any efforts to achieve conventional arms control agreements such as the CFE 
Treaty in the future. What adds even more to the complexity is that Russia 
has proceeded to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, 
thereby undermining the territorial integrity of Georgia.
Fourth, even though large-scale military action in Europe appears un-
likely, the loss of a legal framework to limit holdings of military arsenals should 
be considered a setback. The outbreak of conflict between Georgia and Russia 
in 2008 illustrates that the possibility of minor armed conflict is still very much 
a reality, and that it can contribute to regional arms races. It has even been sug-
gested that Azerbaijan is counting on the CFE Treaty to fail in order to be able 
to increase the size of its military forces (McCausland 2009:6). Such efforts 
would add to the already existing tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, and could possibly have a spill-over ef-
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fect into Georgia as well. While NATO continues to encourage European states 
to raise military forces for crisis management and force projection, a practical 
consequence of a demise of the CFE Treaty may be that it will be more difficult 
for some states to reduce the level of forces they have stationed domestically 
(Peters 1997:9).
As long as the current deadlock between NATO and Russia continues, it 
will add weight to those arguing in favor of abandoning the Treaty (Lachowski 
2009:6). It cannot be ruled out that some states will seek alternative security 
arrangements that will seek to compensate for the deadlocked CFE Treaty. Rus-
sia’s southern neighbors, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, are more likely to 
experience a local build-up of forces in their proximity than other states (Weitz 
2008:10). NATO states, including the Baltic States and Norway, are less likely 
to revise their security strategies in response to the impasse over the CFE Trea-
ty.30 Turkey, on the other hand, worry that increased Russian military deploy-
ments in the Caucasus could further increase tensions (Weitz 2009:10). This 
was indeed what happened during the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 
2008. Should the Treaty deteriorate further, the perhaps most serious and last-
ing impact of the suspension may be that European states may come to attach 
less weight to conventional arms control efforts, at least for as long as Russia 
does not demonstrate its willingness to take an active part in existing security 
arrangements. 
From a Russian perspective, any future solution to the current dead-
lock is to be found in the form of concessions made by NATO. In other words, 
Russia has invited NATO to play a zero-sum game over the CFE Treaty. Even 
if NATO agrees to drop the flank regime from the Treaty in order to persuade 
Russia to resume participation, it is unlikely to be sufficient simply because Rus-
sia has too little to gain from the CFE Treaty. On the other hand, it is debatable 
whether NATO will lose much by maintaining the status quo. Although the 
Treaty has provided military transparency and stability in Europe since the end 
of the Cold War, a dramatic increase in the size of conventional forces in Europe 
appears much less likely today than immediately after the Cold War. Given the 
complex security situation in the Caucasus, however, there may nevertheless be 
mounting pressure from some states to either negotiate a new treaty, or to aban-
don the CFE altogether.
Implications for non-aligned states
Since the end of the Cold War, the CFE Treaty has provided security benefits 
not only for its participating states, but also for states which are not part of the 
Treaty. For example, despite being a non-participating state of the CFE Treaty, 
Finland has gained from greater stability in Europe’s northern region. Finland 
has also benefited from the provisions in the flank regime which further limit 
the concentration of Russian forces in the northern flank. Russia has had an 
obligation to reduce its level of conventional military forces in the proximity to 
of the Finnish border, while Finland has had no requirement to do the same. It 
30 In a display of sovereignty, Norway regularly dispatches fighter planes in proximity of its 
maritime borders in the Norwegian Sea to visually identify Russian long-range bombers 
on exercise and patrol. While this does not mean that relations with Russia are strained, 
it does illustrate the emphasis Norway attaches to actively monitoring and responding to 
foreign military activity in its area of interest.
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could therefore be argued that Finland has been one of the major benefactors of 
the CFE regime because there have been no obligations or costs associated with 
it for Finland.
As a non-NATO state, Finland’s need for an independent and credible 
military force to safeguard its sovereignty is more urgent than for most NATO-
members. Even with membership in the EU, Finland does not have an external 
security guarantee from other states in the form of membership in a military 
alliance. An eventual future Finnish participation in the Treaty therefore largely 
depends on Finland’s ability to maintain its own required force levels. In the 
event of potential future CFE-participation, however, there is a probability that 
Finland would have to reduce its current conventional force level according to 
the level which could be jointly agreed upon by the other treaty states (Olin 
2000:68). For the moment, and as long as Russia does not participate in the 
Treaty, it appears highly unlikely that Finland would consider joining, as the 
positive effects of the Treaty is now significantly reduced. This would also lend 
some support to the hypothesis that the Russian suspension may cause Euro-
pean states to attach less weight to conventional arms control.
On the other hand, should Finland join NATO, Russia would have an 
incentive to increase its force concentration in the northern flank in order to 
compensate for the growth in NATO capabilities. From a Finnish perspective, 
this could potentially reduce the overall level of stability in Finland’s border 
regions (Olin 2000:69). Another factor that may play a role in Finnish security 
considerations is that the information exchange and verification measures of 
the CFE Treaty could be seen to compromise key features of the Finnish defense 
forces, which may potentially reduce Finland’s ability to respond in the event 
of a conflict due to its proximity to Russia. Finland may therefore be one state 
which is better off by not participating in the CFE Treaty, all the time Finland is 
not a member of a military alliance. 
The Case of Norway
What could be the consequences for a flank state such as Norway, should the 
confidence building and stabilizing benefits of the CFE Treaty completely evapo-
rate? Many western European CFE states, including Norway, continue to stress 
the value of the CFE Treaty in European security.31 While most states attach 
similar values to the CFE regime as Norway, Norway’s proximity to Russia and 
the potential consequences if disputes arise over economic interests in the High 
North indicate that Norway has a particular interest in military stability in the 
northern flank. The flank regime has provided a degree of military stability and 
transparency which Norway has benefited from in its relations with Russia. 
Although there is currently no indication that a military conflict will break out 
between Norway and Russia, the CFE Treaty has traditionally served as a stabi-
lizing factor in bilateral security relations.
Norway’s traditional view has been that any solution to the current 
challenges associated with the CFE Treaty should be based on existing security 
structures and arrangements. In other words, as is the case with other NATO 
members, the optimal solution for Norway is one in which Russia resumes its 
31 See, for example, Norway’s statement at the joint meeting of the Permanent Council and 
the Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna on 18 February 2009.
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participation in the CFE Treaty. This view is based primarily on the value Nor-
way attaches to the flank regime, as well as the assumption that it is possible to 
persuade Russia into resuming participation in the Treaty. In addition, Norway 
shares an interest with other NATO states in maintaining a consensus within 
NATO. The current deadlock between NATO and Russia means, however, that 
the flank regime does not provide security benefits as long as Russia is not par-
ticipating in the regime. Since Russia is unlikely to resume participation in the 
CFE Treaty without concessions from NATO, Norway has to balance its future 
approach to the CFE Treaty in a way that accommodates the interests of NATO 
while at the same time seeking to address Russian concerns. Against these con-
siderations, at least three different strategies can be conceived.
First, Norway could continue to pursue the current NATO strategy in 
which the aim is to persuade Russia to implement its obligations undertaken at 
the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit. If successful, it would allow ratification of the 
Adapted Treaty and encourage renewed Russian engagement with the CFE re-
gime. Second, both Norway and Turkey have been worried that their local secu-
rity interests, particularly regarding the continuation of the flank regime, could 
be compromised in a deal struck between NATO and Russia (Peters 1997:8). 
Should this happen, Norway could conceivably pursue bilateral negotiations 
with Russia outside the scope of the CFE Treaty with the aim of retaining some 
elements of the Treaty or to negotiate a new security arrangement. Such an 
arrangement could for example include adoption of a bilateral inspections re-
gime, an expansion of existing transparency measures, creation of a long-term 
exercise calendar, establishment of new territorial sufficiency rules, creation of 
state-based counter-concentration rules and limitations on the organization of 
military forces (Peters 1997:23-40). The range of issues is only limited by what 
is defined as militarily sufficient in order to provide the desired level of security.
Third, Norway could, in collaboration with NATO, take the initiative 
to work towards the negotiation of a new conventional arms control treaty with 
Russia. Even though some of the most fundamental principles of the CFE Treaty 
have been rendered obsolete following the end of the Cold War (for example the 
principle of balance of force), many of its key features have proven remarkably 
successful in the post Cold War era. These key features could be replicated in a 
new comprehensive arms control regime. Ideally, the “CFE II” would include 
the inspections- and verification measures that have been instrumental in the 
CFE regime. It would, however, have to be explored whether it is possible to 
negotiate a treaty which all stakeholders can agree upon (Chernov 1995:89). 
At least two significant challenges must first be overcome. The first is to solve 
the disagreement between NATO and Russia over the implementation of the 
Istanbul commitments. The second is to examine how the flank regime can be 
modified to reduce existing Russian concerns, while still being relevant to flank 
states such as Norway and Turkey. The “CFE II” is likely to end up as a greatly 
watered down version of the current Treaty. It may prove to be of little value to 
some states. 
While none of the three options mentioned above may appear as ideal 
strategies for NATO, the first and current strategy is the least likely to bear fruit. 
As long as Russia is suspending its participation in the CFE Treaty, the prospect 
of the Adapted Treaty entering into force remains remote. Should NATO states 
proceed to ratify the Adapted Treaty regardless of Russia’s implementation of 
the Istanbul commitments, it would be regarded as a compromise with Russia 
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at the expense of Georgia and Moldova. It could also encourage further Russian 
demands, and there is no guarantee that Russia would not suspend participation 
in the Adapted Treaty as well, because Russia has already expressed a strong 
dissatisfaction with the CFE Treaty, including the flank regime. Even if Rus-
sia would comply with the Treaty in the future, there is no guarantee that this 
would bring moderation to Russia’s behavior, for example in the southern flank 
(Falkenrath 1995:144). NATO may have little to gain by ratifying the Adapted 
Treaty without prior Russian compliance with the Istanbul commitments.
The second strategy, which involves the negotiation of a bilateral ar-
rangement, should also be avoided. Norway would by doing so risk to under-
mine NATO’s common position and set an unfortunate precedent by pursuing 
alternatives outside a multilateral framework. On the other hand, while recog-
nizing Norway’s interest in a revitalization of the flank regime, it can be argued 
that the flank regime is not an essential component of Norwegian security inter-
ests. Norway can manage without the flank regime and maintain a stable and 
credible military relationship with Russia, mainly due to membership in NATO. 
It would not be in Norway’s interest to insist on maintaining the flank regime 
in any future negotiations if this prevents NATO from reaching consensus on a 
new agreement with Moscow over the CFE Treaty.
The Way Ahead 
At least five different scenarios could shape the future of the CFE Treaty in Eu-
ropean security (McCausland 2009:7). The first is a continuation of the status 
quo, i.e. a continued Russian suspension combined with a continued NATO 
implementation of the Treaty. One reason why NATO has continued to im-
plement the Treaty without Russia might be that Russia’s overall compliance 
with the Treaty in the past has been good, raising expectations for a renewed 
Russian commitment in the future. This situation can only last as long as most 
NATO states still believe that Russia will actually return to the Treaty in the 
future, a situation which is unlikely to be sustained indefinitely (McCausland 
2009:4). On the other hand it cannot be ruled out entirely that western decision 
makers will continue to stick to the CFE Treaty for a considerable amount of 
time, which might be due at least partially to the effect of the norms and rules 
which have been already established by the CFE regime. This would suggest that 
beliefs and values have evolved sufficiently under the CFE regime to make the 
regime sustainable regardless of shifts in the balance of power or perceptions 
of threats (Duffield 1992:839).32 It could also explain why NATO has already 
implemented the Treaty for some time without Russian participation. However, 
since Russia is unlikely to re-enter the CFE regime without substantial revisions 
to the Treaty, it is possible that the Treaty will gradually become more and more 
irrelevant as an arms control mechanism. Even in the unlikely case that Russia 
would prefer to participate in the Treaty rather than having it completely aban-
doned, it would be very difficult for Russia to resume its participation without 
at least some form of concessions from NATO.
32 Regimes can have an influence on state behavior. A regime-based explanation could 
include a four-step approach: Identification of norms and rules, demonstration that 
actions have been consistent with those norms and rules, indications of the general 
cause of compliance, and documentation of the influence of regime considerations in the 
calculations of decision makers and the internalization of behavior (Duffield 1992:840).
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Second, NATO could potentially ignore or agree to some or most of 
the Russian demands and proceed to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty. As noted 
above, this approach would most certainly have a negative impact on the rela-
tions between Georgia and Moldova and NATO. It could also indirectly weaken 
the CFE regime since it could reduce Russia’s motivation to withdraw militarily 
from Georgia and Moldova. There would be no pressure left on Russia to with-
draw its forces unless NATO adopts a new strategy which compensates for the 
compromise in relations to the Istanbul commitments.
Third, an effort by NATO and Russia to address remaining concerns 
over the Istanbul commitments was attempted in 2008. The idea was to imple-
ment a step by step approach, in which Russian withdrawal from the territo-
ries of Georgia and Moldova would be followed by NATO states ratifying the 
Adapted Treaty. These negotiations made little progress between March and 
August 2008 (McCausland 2009:3). Since the entry into force of the Adapted 
Treaty depends on ratification by all states, including Georgia and Moldova, 
any attempts along the same lines are likely to fail as long as there are still Rus-
sian forces stationed in these two states. The conflict between Georgia and Rus-
sia in the fall of 2008 further complicates any efforts along similar lines in the 
future, and makes this scenario unlikely to be repeated.
Fourth, NATO and Russia could start to negotiate a new treaty which 
would replace both the original and the Adapted CFE Treaty. The “CFE II” 
would have to address the major Russian concerns, while at the same time build-
ing on the key features of the original Treaty. Acknowledging the possibility that 
it may result in a greatly watered-down version of the CFE Treaty, it could still 
be sufficient to revitalize conventional arms control in Europe and play a posi-
tive role by continuing the confidence-building element of the CFE Treaty. How-
ever, during the negotiations on the Adapted Treaty, some argued that the CFE 
Treaty has value to the West in its present form and that it would be unwise to 
give it up by making substantial changes (Peters 1997:7). This would also apply 
in the case of a new Treaty, and there is no doubt that an attempt to agree on a 
watered down version of the CFE Treaty would be of much less value compared 
to the current regime if it was to be implemented by all parties. While it is still a 
possible scenario that NATO and Russia could potentially agree on a new con-
ventional arms control treaty, the disagreement over the Istanbul commitments 
may prove to be more difficult to resolve.
Finally, Russia could potentially decide to resume its participation in 
CFE Treaty without achieving any concessions from NATO. However, given the 
strong interest Russia currently has in a major revision of the CFE Treaty, this 
is not likely to happen. For domestic reasons in particular, it would be hard to 
undo the Russian rhetoric which was used to justify a suspension from the Trea-
ty in 2007 without any major concessions from Western states. Instead, Russia 
has recently proposed that European states should take part in a new European 
security arrangement based on “equality and mutual benefit” (Remnick 2008).33 
Although the disagreement over the CFE Treaty could serve as an initiator for 
33 An implication of this and similar ideas could be that NATO would assume a less 
prominent role in European security while broader arenas such as the OSCE would 
become more important (Peters 1997:9). As long as NATO proves to be more successful 
for managing security issues, however, it is unlikely that NATO would give priority to the 
OSCE.
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new substantial discussions on European security, it is doubtful that it will hap-
pen as long as the major issues of the CFE deadlock continue to remain a source 
of contention in relations between Russia and the West. At this point it is simply 
unclear whether the source of disagreement between Russia and NATO can be 
successfully resolved within the framework of the CFE regime (McCausland 
2009:7).
The CFE Treaty was primarily designed to prevent or reduce the likeli-
hood of armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In this respect, 
the Treaty has already outlived its original purpose. Whereas the main objective 
of arms control during the Cold War was to prevent large-scale war between 
East and West, the question today is rather to what degree states can address 
security concerns such as the threats posed by transnational terrorism, crime, 
nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction.34 The need for conven-
tional arms control in Europe may be less today than what it was during the 
Cold War, suggesting that the CFE Treaty may be of only marginal importance 
to most European states today. It could be difficult to sustain the relevance of 
the CFE Treaty in the future as long as it does not address contemporary secu-
rity challenges.
The main impediment of a breakthrough in any future CFE negotiations 
could very well be the lack of a strategic threat posed by conventional forces in 
Europe. States such as for example Norway may have more to gain by relying 
on NATO for its security needs, and may not necessarily need the CFE Treaty at 
the present time. The CFE Treaty is clearly better than no treaty at all, assuming 
it is being implemented also by Russia, but it should not be regarded as an es-
sential component of Norwegian security. Norway and other states could drop 
the stake in the flank regime if necessary, simply because NATO provides a suffi-
cient and credible security guarantee. While it is still possible that an agreement 
on remaining issues can be reached between NATO and Russia over the CFE 
Treaty, it will require substantial political will and flexibility in negotiations on 
both sides before this can happen.
Conclusion
Unlike during the Cold War, the CFE Treaty in its present form does not address 
the most compelling security threats to European states. Its value lies primarily 
in reducing the possibility of large-scale military conflict in Europe and by serv-
ing as a confidence-building mechanism between NATO and Russia. The Treaty 
may continue to play a diminished role in limiting the upper limits of military 
forces and to promote confidence-building and transparency in Europe, but it 
is increasingly irrelevant for states which are unlikely to fight each other. The 
Treaty is also to a large extent irrelevant as an arms control mechanism long as 
Russia does not participate.
From a Russian perspective, the CFE Treaty was dealt a lethal blow at 
the same time as the first Eastern European states joined NATO. In order to sus-
tain the principle of balance of force in the CFE Treaty, the growing imbalance 
in military forces between East and West can only be addressed by restricting 
NATO force levels (Chernov 1995:89). Given the skepticism of many Eastern 
34 Definitions of weapons of mass destruction typically include nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons.
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European states towards Russia’s intentions, it appears unlikely that Russia can 
expect any such concessions. Russia therefore has very little to gain from the 
CFE Treaty in its present form. Unless these and other circumstances change 
dramatically, the CFE Treaty will eventually lose its significance as a security 
regime in Europe and cease to be a cornerstone of European security.
NATO is unlikely to pressure Russia too much on the issue of the Istan-
bul commitments. While they are important in NATO’s relations with Georgia 
and Moldova, NATO needs to cooperate with Russia on a range of other politi-
cal, economic and security issues. In addition, there is very little that can real-
istically be achieved through any form of coercion against Russia. Any future 
solution to the current deadlock of the CFE Treaty requires a new incentive for 
Russia to rejoin the Treaty. With persistent security concerns in Russia’s south-
ern flank, it appears unlikely that Russia will face such an incentive in the near 
future.
European states, including Norway, have various options available to 
them in order to seek solutions to the current impasse. These options vary from 
maintaining the status quo, entering bilateral negotiations or to negotiate a new 
arms control treaty with Russia. Regardless of which option is chosen, the most 
negative outcome for NATO would be one where Georgian and Moldovan con-
cerns are not taken into account, or where NATO’s common negotiating posi-
tion is undermined. Maintaining the status quo might be the least problematic 
strategy for NATO.
A different question is whether NATO really needs the CFE Treaty. 
Even if the practical implication of the suspension is that there will be less trans-
parency in European military relations, it does not necessarily have to be a ma-
jor concern for NATO as long as relations with Russia are maintained through 
other means. In addition, European relations as well as conventional arms con-
trol has progressed to the extent that an outbreak of major conventional conflict 
between East and West appears unlikely to happen. It is therefore not obvious 
that a future dissolution of the CFE regime will have any major consequences 
for European security. What is obvious, however, is that a future dissolution of 
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